Though this is not my usual topic of interest, but few readings have really captured my linguistic bent of mind to read about it and post my views. So for the time being, deviating from regular Minimalist Sytax.....
Continuing in the line of discussion proposed by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch that Syntactic Recursion is the only unique aspect of human language differentiating them from non-human primates, lets look at some evidences and experiments from literature related to the syntactic rule learning ability of the non human primates. Zuberbuhlar’s (2004) study shows that vocalizations and differences in alarm calls by monkeys can be treated as semantic signals in the sense that monkeys compares signals according to their meanings and not just their acoustic properties. To date, there has been no evidence that they go beyond this simple semanticity. Whatever syntactic evidence found in animal communication, is phonological syntax, referring to rules that specify the assembly of smaller vocal units into larger ones. In phonological syntax, the units, like the letters in a written word, have no independent meaning. In lexical syntax, the units, such as the words in an English sentence, have meanings which contribute to the overall meaning of the whole signal. Many bird species can learn songs with phonological syntax. Oscine birds, which learn complex songs, are very distant relatives of humans. Many other birds, and more closely related species, including most mammals, do not produce calls composed of independent subunits. Our closest relatives, the apes, do produce long calls composed of subunits.
Efficient and wide spread adoption of new words would seem to require that both speaker and hearer attribute intention and belief to one another. It seems possible, then, that some sort of rudimentary theory of mind might be necessary for the learning of words and language. If true, this hypothesis might explain the lack of vocal learning by monkeys, because all evidence to date suggests that monkeys cannot attribute mental states to others. In contrast, word learning in even very young children seems to be accompanied by primitive mental state attribution. Clearly, young children of one and two years of age do not have a fully developed theory of mind, in the sense that they attribute false beliefs to others. By the age of one year, however, they already seem to understand that words can be mapped onto objects and actions in the world. Crucially, this understanding seems to be accompanied by a form of “social referencing,” in which the child uses other people’s direction of gaze, gestures, and emotions to appraise a situation. Infants by the age of 18 months also actively attend to the speaker’s gaze and focus of attention when inferring the referent of the speaker’s utterance, as if they have developed some tacit understanding that gaze and attention are a reflection of underlying knowledge.
No doubt, we need to look at more literature & studies to dig further into this topic, still even on the basis of this limited reading, I feel that at least some species of nonhuman primates possess in their natural communicative repertoire a small number of calls that serve as semantic labels for objects. Nonetheless, these same animals never seem to create new calls or labels for objects. Why should an animal that already possesses a small number of semantic signals in its vocal repertoire be unable to create new labels for other objects and events in its environment? Why is there so little evidence for learning and modification in the natural calls of nonhuman primates and other mammals? Finally, if animals can be taught to obey sentence like commands by humans, why do they not also spontaneously produce sentences, and why is there no evidence for syntax in the natural communication of animals? Studies have reported that syntactic abilities are conducted under human designed artificial communicative system, but so little is known about their natural communicative abilities unaffected by human influence. Moreover, though it is fair to call such abilities in apes ‘syntactic’, they are still far removed from the human ability to organize sequences of words into complex hierarchically organized sentences. Little is known about the ability of apes to learn hierarchically structured behaviors, although all researchers seem to expect apes to be less proficient at it than humans.
Efficient and wide spread adoption of new words would seem to require that both speaker and hearer attribute intention and belief to one another. It seems possible, then, that some sort of rudimentary theory of mind might be necessary for the learning of words and language. If true, this hypothesis might explain the lack of vocal learning by monkeys, because all evidence to date suggests that monkeys cannot attribute mental states to others. In contrast, word learning in even very young children seems to be accompanied by primitive mental state attribution. Clearly, young children of one and two years of age do not have a fully developed theory of mind, in the sense that they attribute false beliefs to others. By the age of one year, however, they already seem to understand that words can be mapped onto objects and actions in the world. Crucially, this understanding seems to be accompanied by a form of “social referencing,” in which the child uses other people’s direction of gaze, gestures, and emotions to appraise a situation. Infants by the age of 18 months also actively attend to the speaker’s gaze and focus of attention when inferring the referent of the speaker’s utterance, as if they have developed some tacit understanding that gaze and attention are a reflection of underlying knowledge.
No doubt, we need to look at more literature & studies to dig further into this topic, still even on the basis of this limited reading, I feel that at least some species of nonhuman primates possess in their natural communicative repertoire a small number of calls that serve as semantic labels for objects. Nonetheless, these same animals never seem to create new calls or labels for objects. Why should an animal that already possesses a small number of semantic signals in its vocal repertoire be unable to create new labels for other objects and events in its environment? Why is there so little evidence for learning and modification in the natural calls of nonhuman primates and other mammals? Finally, if animals can be taught to obey sentence like commands by humans, why do they not also spontaneously produce sentences, and why is there no evidence for syntax in the natural communication of animals? Studies have reported that syntactic abilities are conducted under human designed artificial communicative system, but so little is known about their natural communicative abilities unaffected by human influence. Moreover, though it is fair to call such abilities in apes ‘syntactic’, they are still far removed from the human ability to organize sequences of words into complex hierarchically organized sentences. Little is known about the ability of apes to learn hierarchically structured behaviors, although all researchers seem to expect apes to be less proficient at it than humans.
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