Tuesday, June 8, 2010

Foucault's Power/Knowledge: An Overview

Publishing a post on some work I did during my MA days in a Semiotics course, thanks to my maid... these days I am free from the domestic drudgery... so got time to indulge in some reading session this weekend.... 

INTRODUCTION
For most of the critics power is an irreducibly evaluative notion and moreover one which is negatively valued. Since it limits to the free activity and self-expression of the individual, power is that which must be opposed. This humanist consensus is neatly summed up in David Hoy's remark that" the antithesis to power is usually thought to be freedom. Foucault's concepts of power don't conform to this view. 

Etymologically 'power' is derived from the Latin word 'potere', to be able, the ability to do or act. In this sense, power is something, which inheres in an individual or body of some kind. We may think of it as a potential to do certain things or to make some kind of difference in the world. The power of an individual will include the ability to develop certain specific capacities, such as those involved in intellectual, aesthetic or moral judgments and action. Nevertheless, the power of an independent or body at any given moment is logically independent of any relation to others. 

Modem political theory has conceptualized on power that is exercised on others as which is in cooperation with others. Another tradition defines power in terms of the ability to act in concert with others, in the pursuit of collective goals. In both cases, power involves a relation to others, differentiating itself from the concept outlined above. The non-relational concept of power - 'power to' is distinguished from exercise of 'power over' another in order to maintain a form of capture of the other's own power or capacities. Though there is a conceptual difference between the two senses, in practice they are interrelated. One person's power over another may derive from his/her own personal capabilities i.e., the capacity to carry off power. The importance of this distinction is that it enables us to clarify the conceptual structure of Foucault's discussions on power.

One important aspect in the Foucauldian thought is that his concepts of power (power/knowledge in fact) is rooted in historical view, which centers on the transition from the traditional to the modern, industrial societies and specifically concerned with the forms of knowledge and modes of social organization characteristics of capitalist modernity. To Foucault power was not socially or structurally static. Rather power was historically specific to the particular society at a particular time and could only be understood in this context. Techniques are needed to be understood to know how power worked in a particular society at a time.Lets make an critical attempt to discuss the notion of power and knowledge taking into consideration whether the approach is acceptable one in the post-modem society in the light of the following points:
  • Foucault's concepts of Power: how it works
  • Power/knowledge
  • Power and Discourse
  • Criticism of Foucault's Power/Knowledge
  • Conclusion
FOUCAULT'S CONCEPTS OF POWER: HOW IT WORKS
Foucault has demystified power. His analysis states that power is situated among a cacophony of social practices and situations. He explains the importance of power in The History of Sexuality as omnipresence." Power is everywhere not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere," says Foucault. Power is not possessed by any dominant group/argent in relation to those dominated, but is instead distributed throughout complex social network. Foucault attempts to see power in a non- totalizing (allowing multiplicity of discourses in knowledge), non- representational, anti-humanist scheme. He rejects the notion of power to be associated with the ruling classes. He gives a post-modem approach to power and sees power as heterogeneous subjects and productive, constituting individual bodied and identities. He argues how the two models of power- economical (suggested by Marx) and judicial are defective. Foucault's “The History of Sexuality” talks of a new mode of power known as ' bio-power'. He argues that with the constitution of bio-power as the central concern of the modern state, sex became the focus of an explosion of discourses concerning the health and body. Thus discourses like organic physiology, neurology, psychology etc. which established life as the focus of power where the primary concern was the body and descent of the classes that ruled. Foucault talks of three characteristics of power. First power is productive. Second power is only exercised by individuals but never possessed by them and thirdly, power is' involved in every social relation. "His contention is that the individual is constituted by power, individual existence and identity are among power effects. The individual exercises power at certain times and in certain places as a functionary of power's intentions, but not his own" (S Panneerselvam, 2000). Foucault further says: "There is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject .... the rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed tactics which, becoming connected to one another"---Foucault(Power/Knowledge, 1980).

Stressing the role of power, Foucault further argues that a society without power relations can only be an abstraction and in every social field, there are relations of power throughout. It was during 1970s (transition period from archaeology to genealogy), he developed his theory of power and his historical visions of unknown, forgotten, rejected problems of madness, sexuality, poverty, punishment etc. He argues that the nature of power is not yet fully comprehended. His concept of power is concerned with forms of knowledge and social organizations in the context of this historical vision that is based on the transition from traditional to modem industrial societies. His concern here was with the emergence of modem forms of administration of the social world. In both Madness and Civilization and The Birth of the Clinic, he makes it clear that his concern was with the physical rather than the moral disorder. In The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things his concern was towards the internal structure of scientific discourse, especially the discourse of human sciences. According to Foucault, truth, morality and meaning are created through discourse. Every' age has a dominant group of discursive elements that people live in unconsciously. In the past the idea of individualism was prominent in American discourse. To not be individualistic, i.e. be 'communist' was to be evil: So that discourse in a college class, more specially, will ultimately privilege ideas of what is normal ("good", and "normative" morals); by stressing these values, education will implicitly marginalize those who don't hold those values. Foucault persuasively explains how power works (through discourse) and within his worldview there is no absolute morality. Morality is created through the exercise of power.

Foucault explains the notion of power as follows: "We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'makes', it 'conceals'. In fact power produces; it produces realities; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" ----“Discipline and Punish”. He rejects the repressive and negative aspects of power and apprehends it as positive and productive. Power constitutes the individuals on whom and through whom it subsequently operates.
He says: “The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain courses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals" ----Power/Knowledge.

POWER/KNOWLEDGE
Most of the traditional ideas of power originated with Francis Bacon. It was Bacon who said, "Knowledge is power". On the contrary, Michael Foucault asserts a new model of power and knowledge. He called it power/knowledge. In his writings of 1970 one can see the relation between forms of power and forms of knowledge. He says that power is a pre-condition of knowledge rather than knowledge is pre-condition for power. The important point in Foucault power/knowledge is the belief that those who are in power have specialized knowledge. In cases like this every production of knowledge serves the interest of power. Thus knowledge produced in economics, medicine, psychiatry and other human sciences is nothing but a part of the power of the social institutions that have grown around these disciplines. Thus he denies independent knowledge. In “Discipline and Punish”, and other writings one can see the relation between power and knowledge, which is scattered in different forms. Again in The “Order of Things”, he discusses the emergence of the human sciences and the importance of such a study where the rules, assumptions focusing on the shifts in the sciences of life, labor and knowledge of human societies are important.

Foucault idea of power/knowledge brings to our attention the fact that in fields of 'specialized knowledge';  our actions are governed by the constituents of the power structure. This means that there cannot be criminology without prisons, forensic DNA without police and medicine without the clinic. It means understanding in the fields of knowledge are manufactured within their discourse. Having a specialized knowledge in a unique discourse allows a psychiatrist to have unique power and control. The psychiatrist has power to diagnose a condition, and only because the person belongs to this specialized discourse, their word is considered authoritative and 'true'. Hence they have power.

Foucault idea of power revolves around his idea of discourse. For Foucault power is derived through discourse (through knowledge). Those discourses that are decided by the main body of society are the hegemonic discourse. Discourse joins power and knowledge and its power follows from our 'casual acceptance of the reality with which we are presented' (Peter Weir- “The Truman Show”). If our identity is created by the media, as it is increasingly, our world view is limited to the world view of those isolated group. These discourses (promoted by the dominant group) become hegemonic because they are promoted and eventually accepted as truth. The truth in modem society, is derived from (specialized) knowledge, especially that from human sciences. So for Foucault, power/knowledge are directly linked to each other. Clearly then, the groups in a society that can control knowledge and how it is used, will have the ability to determine, at least to an extent, what the truth is. From this, they will then be able to exercise at least some power within the society.

POWER AND DISCOURSE
Discourse is generally used to designate the forms of representation, codes, conventions and habits of language that produce specific fields of culturally and historically located meanings. Foucault gave the term 'discursive practices' and 'discursive formations' to the analysis of particular institutions and their ways of establishing the orders of truth or what is accepted as 'reality' by a given society. Knowledge is posited as a construct that we imbue with power. Those who possess the knowledge deemed value at a given moment in time/space and deemed powerful. This power, implicit in discourse, then dominate our understanding (notion of discursive formation); it constraints the way we are able to interpret events, behavior, situations etc. in our lives, discursive domination is reflected in the power of doctors over lunatics, of police over civilian, of experts over laymen and in the last resort, the power of society over its members. Thus 'discursive formations' will give definition to a -particular historical moment or episteme. 'Discursive formations' do nevertheless displays hierarchical arrangement and understood as reinforcing already established identities or Subjectivities. These dominant discourses are understood as in turn reinforced by existing systems of law, education and media. 
Discourse constructs a topic. It defines and produces objects of knowledge. It governs the way a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. The study of discourse (be it madness, sexuality, sickness and the like) includes:
  • Statements about madness etc.
  • Rules which prescribe certain ways of talking about those topics and exclude others (rules of inclusion and exclusion)
  • "Subject" who in some ways personify the discourse- the mad man, the hysterical woman 
  • How this knowledge about the topic acquires authority, a sense of embodying the 'truth' about it 
  • Practices within institutions for dealing with the subjects- medical treatment for the insane, punishment for the guilty
  • Discursive formation- the emergence of a new discourse, decline of the old one 
DISCOURSE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER
  • Knowledge linked to power not only assumes the authority of the 'truth' but has the power to make belief true.
  • Not 'truth' of knowledge in the absolute sense- but of a discursive formation sustaining a regime of truth.
  • Power circulates: it is never monopolized by one centre. It is deployed through a net like organisation.
  • Power- is not only negative, it is also productive---" it traverses, produces things, it induces pleasures, forms of knowledge, produces discourse." 
Yet Foucault did not see power as being completely dominating, rather he sees power as being diffused throughout the society, through complex social networks. Foucault argued that whenever power was exercised these was likely to be resistance to it. This resistance was based on discourse. By creating a critical knowledge of a hegemonic discourse, those resisting it could then claim new truth of their own. This new truth, if accepted, could become the new hegemonic discourse which would attract new resistance to it. In this way, power, resistance and truth were never static or permanent concepts, but were always subject to resistance and change.
 "Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowance for the concepts complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it."- (Foucault, 1980)
CRITICISM OF FOUCAULT'S POWER/KNOWLEDGE
All of Foucault's writings from “Madness and Civilization” to the “History of Sexuality” presuppose a close proximity of power and knowledge. But according to the critics, the concept of power has a drawback because if this intrinsic relation between knowledge and power. It is also argued that his critique of modernity is one-sided in its focus on repressive forms of rationalization and fails to acknowledge the merits of modernity. His criticism that modernity has brought only domination cannot be accepted because modernity has brought advances in medicine, democracy, liberty, law, or equality that are not acknowledged by Foucault. For him power breeds resistance but the nature of this resistance is not explained by him. He has not taken into account how the agents in positions of economic and political power administrate power.

Foucault's early works attempt to study social history according to changes in discourse. The concept of discourse becomes an overreaching category that explains the cohesion and unity of social practices. However, his later works move away from discourse and concerns itself more itself with practice and power. This is where Foucault's arguments were contradicted by critical realism's conception of a structural and stratified social world, which is necessary, if we are to conceive of traditional Marxist nations of state power and underlying economic relations. The reason behind his approach to "history as a non-evolutionary, fragmented field of disconnect knowledge and society as a dispersed regularity of unevenly developing levels of discourse" (S Panneerselvam, 2000) can be traced back to the impact of Nietzchean genealogy (on Foucault) that welcomes in the more diverse, fragmented and less unified aspects of society. Foucault explores the connection between knowledge and power in Nietzcshean fashion that how the will to truth and knowledge is interpreted as a will to power.

The whole debate between the Foucault and the critical realists can be summed up as the debate between social structures vs. social practice. While the critical realism insists on the social structure as continuously reproduced and occasionally transformed, Foucault's works (though his earlier ones were more concerned with structure) gradually loses its conception of structure and offers a rather unclear account of social practices and power relations. Instead of looking at where and from whom power comes, Foucault is concerned only with its practice and effects. He doesn't link power to a particular class nor even to the state. It is claimed that power is not something that is imposed on us, but a stream of energy that flowing through every living organism and every human society. Since Foucault is a post structurialist, he tends to avoid the question of underlying social structures, concentrating instead on the network of power-knowledge relations operating at the level of their exercise.

Foucault's late works start to move away from more negative view of power with its one-sided focus on the institutional basis of power. There is a shift in focus towards power in relation to the subject. There is an interplay between power and freedom as individuals struggle against imposed identities. Life is not totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer- it constantly escapes them (Foucault, 1981). In this less monolithic account of power, techniques of domination are balanced with the techniques of the self. This is in keeping with the view that human body acts as the centre of different power struggles and allows Foucault to place more emphasis on practical self-consciousness, critical self-awareness and reflexivity.

This is important in showing that social power and social cohesion is no longer monolithic or all-powerful. The exploration of the relation between techniques of government and techniques of the self opens up the question of consent and therefore the possibility of opposing or challenging dominant discourses and power relations. The problem, is that the shift towards first power, and then the subjects, is achieved at the cost of a structural analysis. Although the relational approach emphasizes that al social relations can be contested, without a notion of social structure, we must wonder what there is no contest. It is not a surprise, therefore, that Foucault is unable to offer much in the way of a counter-hegemonic movement does emerge, Foucault would oppose it for the same reasons he opposes the dominant hegemonic power- that it expresses power relations, coercion and so on. His view of power means at best, "opposition finds expression through a politics of the self' --- (Jonathan Joseph, 2004).

CONCLUSION
Since power is inherently hierarchical in its nature, and since the amount and kind of knowledge a person has determines the level of power he/she exercises, if the phrase "knowledge is power" actually means what it says, then the amount of power a person accumulates and exercises in the world must be proportional to the amount of knowledge that person has acquired and possessed. While it serves no useful purpose to pursue the issue of relative amounts of knowledge versus power this or that individual has and exercises, in any specific context, mine versus his/hers, for instance, it is nevertheless inescapably obvious that in many, even most, circumstances wide disparities between one thing and the other can usually be found and documented. The problem with this idea is that nothing could be further from the truth. Knowledge and Power, in fact, have virtually nothing to do with each other; one cannot be defined in terms of the other; and there is no sense at all in the assertion that they are equivalent to each other. Power, for instance, cannot be defined at all without recourse to hierarchical structure. In fact, if hierarchy were removed from consideration altogether in this or that context, power itself would vanish along with it. Knowledge, on the other hand, while one might be able to say that this or that individual has more or less of it than someone else, and use that fact to create a semblance of hierarchical structure, ranking the person with more higher than the one with less, knowledge, in and of itself, does not depend on this or that state of rank for its existence. Knowledge of a lesser kind does not cease being knowledge simply because someone values a different kind more highly. Power of a lesser kind, however, always assumes weakness as its mantle instead.

REFERRENCES

F oucault,Michael:
  • Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London: Allen lane, 1979. 
  • History of Sexuality, trans from French by Robert Harley. London: Penguin books, 1976. 
  • Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the age of Reason, trans by Richard Howard. London: Tavistock, 1977. 
  • The Order of Tl11:ngs: an Archeology of Human Science. New York: Vintage Books, 1973. 
  • Gordon, Collin: Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980.
  • Gutting, Gory: The Cambridge Companion to Foucault.Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1.994. 
  • Jonathan, Joseph: 'Foucault and Reality' an article published in Capital and Class Vol. 82(spring 2004) pages 143-165. Horsel Road, London . 
  • Miller, James: The Passion of Michael Foucault. London: Flamigo, 1993. 
  • Paul, Palton: 'Taylor and Foucault on power and freedom' an article published in Political Studies (June, 1989) pages 166-Oxford: Journal Depts. Basil Blackwell LTD.

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